Horgan (1993) proposed that "superdupervenience" -supervenience preserving physicalistic acceptability -is a matter of robust explanation. I argued against him (1999) that (as nearly all physicalist and emergentist accounts reflect) superdupervenience is a matter of Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): every causal power bestowed by the supervenient property is identical with a causal power bestowed by its base property. Here I show that CCP is, as it stands, unsatisfactory, for on the usual understandings of causal power bestowal, it is trivially satisfied or falsified. I offer a revision of CCP which incorporates the evident fact that causal powers are grounded in fundamental forces.
what dependency relation is responsible for the correlations at issue, fail to guarantee that properties supervening on physicalistically acceptable properties will also be physicalistically acceptable (that is, fail to preserve physicalistic acceptability). For example, non-naturalist Malebrancheans might maintain that God (for reasons that we must accept with "supernatural piety"), in the actual world, brings about the instantiation of certain non-physical properties whenever certain physicalistically acceptable base properties are instantiated; and moreover maintain, on grounds of God's constancy, that God does similarly in every possible world. And naturalist emergentists might maintain, on either philosophical or scientific grounds, that instantiations of certain physicalistically acceptable base properties are accompanied by instantiations of emergent properties in every possible world. For example, emergentists might hold, as a philosophical thesis, that properties are essentially individuated in terms of the laws of nature they enter into, such that the hypothesis that the requisite physicalistically acceptable base property is instantiated in a world presupposes, as a matter of law, the instantiation of the emergent property. Or emergentists might hold, as a scientific hypothesis, that there are various "holistic" constraints on what laws of nature may exist at a world, such that, again, any world in which the requisite physicalistically acceptable base property is instantiated is also a world where the emergent property is instantiated. Hence supervening even with metaphysical necessity on physicalistically acceptable properties is no guarantee of physicalistic acceptability; and it seems likely that for any (mere) property correlations that might be suggested, a story might be told about a relation satisfying these correlations, which fails to preserve physicalistic acceptability. 
